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The Fight for Pay: How the Supreme Court Ultimately May Use
Antitrust Law to Allow Student-Athletes to be Paid
Josef Nilhas*
College athletics have always been, and likely will always continue to be,
an incredibly unique American phenomenon.1 At the head of this
phenomenon is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”),
which oversees nearly half a million student-athletes who compete across
twenty-four sports every year.2 Under the current NCAA rules, colleges
may only pay for athletes’ legitimate educational expenses, and any athletes
who are paid to play become ineligible.3 While these student-athletes have
long been considered amateurs, debates over whether college athletes
should be paid have increased in recent years.4 This was further intensified
in September of 2019, when California Governor Gavin Newsom signed the
Fair Play to Play Act into law.5 This Act, which becomes law in the
beginning of 2023, will result in college athletes being allowed to financially
benefit from their name, image, and likeness to promote products and
companies for the first time ever.6
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3 Amy Howe, Amid March Madness, Antitrust Dispute Over College Athlete Compensation
Comes to the Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/amid-march-madness-antitrust-dispute-overcollege-athlete-compensation-comes-to-the-court/.
4 Megan Ryan, Debate Over Paying College Athletes Intensifying on Both Coasts, STAR
TRIBUNE (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.startribune.com/debate-over-paying-collegeathletes-intensifying-on-both-coasts/560832872/.
5 Dan Murphy, California Defies NCAA as Gov. Gavin Newsom Signs Into Law Fair Pay to
Play Act, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.espn.com/collegesports/story/_/id/27735933/california-defies-ncaa-gov-gavin-newsom-signs-law-fair-payplay-act.
6 S.B. 206, (Ca. 2019).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

Soon, the Supreme Court could issue an opinion in NCAA v. Alston that
would end this debate altogether by possibly allowing college athletes to be
compensated for non-educational purposes. To fully understand the
buildup to Alston, one must first look back to NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma, where the Supreme Court found that the
NCAA’s television plan violated antitrust law.7 In making its decision, the
Court held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes
are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of
antitrust cases.8 As a result of this lower standard, the NCAA has always
argued that antitrust law allows them to restrict athlete compensation to
promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from
professional sports.9
Beginning in 2014, several Division 1 athletes sued the NCAA arguing that
the restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits” violates antitrust
law under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 10 This led to a class action suit,
where the student-athletes argued that the NCAA’s restrictions violate
antitrust law by preventing athletes from receiving fair-market
compensation for their labor.11 The district court ruled in favor of the
athletes, saying that the NCAA must allow some academic benefits such as
“computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible
items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless
related to the pursuit of academic studies.”12 However, this apparent
victory was quite limited in scope, as the court held that the NCAA could
still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes.13 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, concluding that the NCAA’s practices
violated antitrust law,14 and in December of 2020, the Supreme Court

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
Id. at 103.
9 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, NCAA v. Alston (Mar. 31, 2021) (No. 20-512, 20-520).
10 Id.
11 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
12 Id. at 1088.
13 Id.
14 Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239
(9th Cir. 2020).
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granted certiorari to ultimately decide whether the NCAA’s prohibition on
compensating college athletes is a violation of federal antitrust law.15
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States.”16 The Supreme Court interpreted Section 1 as
outlawing “only unreasonable restraints.”17 Most often, restraints are
analyzed under the “rule of reason,”18 which is a three step analysis that
attempts “to distinguish between restraints with anticompetitive effect[s]
that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition
that are in the consumer’s best interest.”19 The NCAA believes its eligibility
restrictions should be subject to a less stringent review because they are not
really a commercial venture, and instead are an association to make
collegiate sports possible as part of a greater educational mission of the
university.20
Even under the stricter “rule of reason” antitrust analysis, the NCAA
believes they should prevail, arguing that the Ninth Circuit used the wrong
definition of amateur when affirming the case.21 Pointing to the Court’s
decision in Board of Regents where they said the conception of amateurism
is that student-athletes “must not be paid,”22 the NCAA’s argument focuses
on how their restrictions are positive, and “are so clearly procompetitive
that their lawfulness under the antitrust laws can and should be determined
early in litigation” under any standard of review.23
The student-athletes in Alston argue that the NCAA’s restrictions to protect
amateurism do not create enough benefits for competition to offset the

Brief for Petitioner at 2, NCAA v. Alston, petition for cert. filed, No. 20-512, (U.S. Oct.
2020).
16 The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
17 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 U.S. 2274, 2283 (2018).
18 Id. at 2284.
19 Id.
20 Brief for Petitioner at 15, NCAA v. Alston, petition for cert. filed, No. 20-512, (U.S. Oct.
2020).
21 Id. at 16.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 31.
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harms they create.24 There is also plenty of skepticism regarding how
“amateur” NCAA athletics really are, considering college sports bring in
over $1 billion in revenue each year.25 They argue that what the NCAA is
essentially requesting from the Court is an “outright exemption” from
federal antitrust law.26 The athletes further argue that issuing such an
exemption is inappropriate for the courts, and instead is more aptly suited
for Congress to decide.27
Supporting briefs have been filed in favor of both sides from a variety of
groups.28 One such brief filed by a group of states in favor of the NCAA,
cautioned that if the lower court’s ruling is allowed to stand, colleges will
be in a lose-lose situation by creating tremendous pressure to dramatically
increase their athletic spending.29 The result would be, they argue, that
schools would be forced to either reallocate money from other areas such
as educational programs or non-revenue sports, or not increase athletic
spending at the price of no longer being competitive with other universities’
programs.30 Several briefs have been filed on behalf of the student-athletes,
including from the Biden administration,31 historians,32 and a group of
former NCAA officials.33 Whether arguing that these athletes should not be
Brief for Respondents at 2, NCAA v. Alston, petition for cert. filed, No. 20-512, 20-520
(U.S. Oct. 2020).
25 Victoria Lee Blackstone, How Much Money Do College Sports Generate?, ZACKS (Jan. 28,
2019), https://finance.zacks.com/much-money-college-sports-generate-10346.html.
26 See Brief For Respondent, supra note 24.
27 Id.
28 See Howe, supra note 3 (observing that seven “friend of the court” briefs were filed in
support of the NCAA, while fourteen briefs were filed in support of the student-athletes).
29 Brief for Georgia et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, NCAA v. Alston,
petition for cert. filed, No. 20-512 & 20-520 (U.S. Oct. 2020).
30 Id.
31 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, NCAA v.
Alston, petition for cert. filed, No. 20-512 & 20-520 (U.S. Oct. 2020) (Department of Justice
acknowledging that the NCAA is “unusual” for purposes of antitrust law, but that
NCAA’s eligibility rules should still be subject to the more stringent standard of review).
32 Brief of Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, NCAA v. Alston, petition
for cert. filed, No. 20-512 & 20-520 (U.S. Oct. 2020) (Arguing that the NCAA’s attempt to
rely on amateurism as a way to validate their restrictions under antitrust scrutiny is
“profoundly unfair,” as it led to some coaches and schools earning millions while
students remained poor).
33 Brief of Former NCAA Executives as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, NCAA v.
Alston, petition for cert. filed, No. 20-512 & 20-520 (U.S. Oct. 2020) (Telling the justices that
24
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considered amateur or that the NCAA is clearly profiting off their athletes
who are not paid, these briefs all push for the Court to affirm the Ninth
Circuit and hold that the NCAA’s restrictions on “non-cash educationrelated benefits” violates antitrust law under the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court heard the oral argument for Alston on March 31, 2021,
and while a decision may not come about until sometime this summer,
justices on both sides of the political spectrum were quite skeptical of the
NCAA’s defense regarding amateurism.34 When the NCAA relied on the
historical success of their approach, Justice Kagan said “I guess it doesn’t
move me all that much that there’s a history to this if what is going on now
is that competitors, as to labor, are combining to fix prices.”35 This concern
was shared by Justice Kavanaugh, who believed that it seems like “the
schools are conspiring with competitors, agreeing with competitors . . . to
pay no salaries to the workers who are making the schools billions of dollars
on the theory that consumers want the schools to pay their workers
nothing.”36 Kavanaugh continued, “[a]nd that just seems entirely circular
and even somewhat disturbing.”37 Several of the Justices used variations of
“exploitation” in describing how the student-athletes are being treated.38
However, despite the heavy skepticism, there seemed to be some hesitation
to make any sort of sweeping changes. Justice Breyer discussed how the
case was tough for him “because it's a unique product and it brings joy to a
lot of people,” and that he worries “about judges getting into the business
of deciding how amateur sports should be run.”39

“the NCAA’s professed commitment to ‘amateurism’ has become a way of preserving
the market that the NCAA has come to dominate, rather than a means of protecting and
benefitting college athletes.” They further point out that despite a massive expansion in
revenue raised by major sports, the percentage of revenue actually devoted to financial
aid has decreased.)
34 Dan Wetzel, NCAA v. Alston: Supreme Court Not Impressed with Old Arguments, But How
Will it Rule?, YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 31, 2021), https://sports.yahoo.com/nca-as-stubbornapathetic-nature-on-display-in-front-of-supreme-court-195237939.html.
35 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, NCAA v. Alston (Mar. 31, 2021) (No. 20-512, 20520).
36 Id. at 33.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 17, 34.
39 Id. at 48.
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In the end, it can be extremely difficult to try to predict the outcome of any
Supreme Court case based on how the oral arguments went, and that is no
less true here. Based on the tone and flow of the arguments though, neither
side seemed to have a clear five votes in their favor. However, there does
seem to be a willingness by the Court to at least rule in favor of some
incremental changes that benefit student-athletes. While the athletes hope
for the Court to completely flip the script on the NCAA and find that their
restrictions violate antitrust law, the NCAA hopes the Court will overturn
the Ninth Circuit and fend off proponents of paying student-athletes for a
little bit longer. Whatever the outcome may be, as more states and student
athletes push for compensation, the NCAA’s weak “amateurism”
argument appears to be more exposed every time it is used. Could Alston
be the case to finally defeat the NCAA’s classic argument and change the
game forever? Possibly, if the Supreme Court affirms this decision. But even
if the Court overturns the case and rules in favor of the NCAA, it is clear
that this fight would be far from over.
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